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Many therapies exist to help people combat stress. However, they typically require 
substantial time and money to be effective, an observation that has led researchers to 
explore whether it is possible to design less intensive interventions that build on basic 
science findings concerning the mechanisms underlying stress regulation. Initial evidence 
demonstrating the feasibility of such approaches comes from research indicating that 
single-session attention modification programs attenuate the negative psychological and 
behavioral sequelae of acute stress. However, it less clear whether interventions that 
target how people cognitively construe stress-arousing situations are similarly effective. 
As a first step towards addressing this issue, the present research developed a brief 
cognitive reconstrual exercise that targeted participants’ tendency to self-distance as they 
reflected on an upcoming pubic speaking task. Specifically, participants were randomly 
assigned to reason about their current thoughts and feelings from either a self-immersed 
(i.e., think though your current feelings using the pronoun I) or a self-distanced (i.e., 
think through your current feelings using you and/or your own name when referring to 
yourself) perspective after stress was induced, but before they delivered their speech. The 
implications of this manipulation were then examined using psychological (i.e., shame 
and rumination in Study 1, anxiety and cognitive appraisals in Study 2) and behavioral 
(i.e., speech performance and regulatory depletion in Study 1) measures. Study 1 found 
that participants who self-distanced prior to the speech task gave more impressive 




of regulatory resources compared to those who self-immersed. Study 2 investigated 
whether the beneficial effects of self-distancing could be due to lower threat and greater 
challenge appraisals of the anticipated stressor. Distanced participants showed less threat 
appraisal of the expected speech task, according to a combined demand and anxiety 
measure, than participants in the self-immersed and no-instruction groups. Neither Study 
1 nor 2 found that trait social anxiety level interacted with condition to predict any 
effects. Together, they provide evidence that a brief cognitive reconstrual exercise can 
buffer people, even those most vulnerable to social anxiety, against the negative 
psychological and behavioral consequences of acute stress, and highlight self-distancing 
as a mechanism that future stress and anxiety interventions should consider targeting. 
Furthermore, they offer a theoretical contribution by demonstrating that the effectiveness 
of self-distancing as a technique to promote emotion regulation is not restricted to the 







Many therapies exist to help people combat stress (see Ballenger, 1999, for a 
review). However, they typically require substantial time and money to be effective – an 
observation that has led researchers to explore whether it is possible to design less 
intensive interventions that build on basic science findings concerning the mechanisms 
underlying stress regulation (e.g., Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor, 2008; Ayres 
& Hopf, 1992; Creswell, et al., 2005; Jamieson, Nock, & Mendes, 2011). Motivating this 
work is the idea that large effects can be observed via minimal intervention by targeting 
the specific psychological mechanisms that underlie stress regulation.  
Initial evidence suggesting that such interventions are feasible comes from 
research examining the alteration of attention in those with a predisposition to feel 
especially anxious during social situations (Amir, et al., 2009; Amir, Bomyea, & Beard, 
2010; Amir, et al., 2008). Individuals with trait social anxiety typically demonstrate an 
attentional bias toward threat-relevant information (Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & 
Dombeck, 1990; Mathews, 1990; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). However, recent work 
indicates that it is possible to modify this maladaptive proclivity using a single-session 
computer task designed to retrain attention (Amir, et al., 2010; Amir, et al., 2008). 
Compared to those that did not receive this intervention, socially anxious participants felt 
less ensuing anxiety over a public speech, and even showed better speaking performance 




Although attention represents one mechanism that underlies how people respond 
to stress, decades of research indicates that how people cognitively construe emotionally 
arousing stimuli also powerfully influences the way they think, feel, and behave. Various 
forms of Cognitive Therapy, which targets how people interpret stress-arousing 
situations, have been shown to be effective in curtailing stress (Beck, 1970; Ellis, 1962; 
Resick & Schnicke, 1992). In particular, the cognitive restructuring component of 
Cognitive Therapy, which involves modifying appraisals of physical arousal, appears to 
be especially helpful in reducing symptoms of various forms of clinical anxiety (Gould, 
Otto, & Pollack, 1995).  
Laboratory experiments likewise indicate that people are capable of cognitively 
reappraising negative stimuli in ways that attenuate their impact on emotion and 
physiology (Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989b; Ochsner & 
Gross, 2008). For example, participants asked to reappraise a disgusting film reported 
less negative affect and showed lower physiological arousal (i.e., finger pulse amplitude, 
finger temperature, and skin conductance) than those asked to suppress their feelings of 
disgust while watching the film (Gross, 1998). Another study found that people adept at 
cognitively reappraising negative emotional situations demonstrated healthier emotional 
and cardiovascular responses to an anger-inducing laboratory situation than participants 
low in trait reappraisal ability (Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007). In more recent 
research, some participants were led to reappraise their arousal due to an upcoming 
public speech by hearing from the experimenter that, instead of being a bad thing, bodily 
arousal can assist performance in stressful situations (Jamieson, et al., 2011). Compared 




participants in this reappraisal condition reported having greater resources to cope before 
the stressor, and showed less attentional bias toward threat-related stimuli.  
Despite the wealth of evidence highlighting the beneficial mental health effects of 
changing adverse cognitions, no research has yet examined whether a brief cognitive 
reconstrual intervention can simultaneously buffer people against the psychological and 
behavioral consequences of acute stress. It also remains to be seen whether such benefits 
extend to those high in trait anxiety, a population that is likely more vulnerable to 
stressors. This dissertation is a first step towards investigating these possibilities. 
Specifically, the current research employed a brief cognitive exercise that influenced 
participants’ tendency to self-distance as they reflected over the thoughts and feelings 
they experienced in response to an impending acute stressor. In addition to behavior, 
affect, and cognition measures, trait social anxiety was assessed to begin the examination 
of whether self-distancing in the moment is similarly advantageous for people despite 
individual differences in their typical reaction to a stressor. The extension of these 
findings to those with high trait anxiety is somewhat limited, however, by the relatively 
small sample sizes, particularly in Study 2 (see discussion). 
Self-distancing  
Preliminary evidence suggesting that the adoption of a self-distanced perspective 
may facilitate emotion regulation comes from research examining the psychological 
mechanisms that enable people to adaptively reflect on negative past experiences without 
ruminating. Over the past two decades, a large body of research has examined the mental 
and physical health implications of individuals’ attempts to understand their negative 




facilitates coping under a variety of circumstances (e.g., Austenfeld & Stanton, 2004; 
Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999). For example, Pennebaker and colleagues have shown that 
expressive writing about distressing events has many beneficial consequences, such as 
increased subjective well-being, greater relationship stability, less rumination, and better 
physical health (for reviews, see Baddeley & Pennebaker, 2009; Smyth, Pennebaker, & 
Arigo, 2012). An equally compelling body of research also indicates, though, that 
attempts to understand negative feelings often backfire, leading people to brood over 
their feelings in ways that exacerbate distress (for reviews, see Mor & Winquist, 2002; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008b). 
In an attempt to clarify these divergent findings, Kross, Ayduk, and Mischel 
(2005) proposed that a critical factor determining whether attempts to adaptively reflect 
on negative experiences succeed or fail is the type of self-perspective that people adopt 
when analyzing their feelings. Drawing from research on mood and memory (Nigro & 
Neisser, 1983; Robinson & Swanson, 1993) and on the role of psychological distance in 
self-control (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989a; Trope & Liberman, 2003), Kross et 
al.(2005) hypothesized that people’s attempts to analyze unpleasant experiences often fail 
because they focus on their feelings from a self-immersed perspective (e.g., visualizing 
past events through their own eyes) rather than a self-distanced perspective (e.g., 
visualizing past situations from the viewpoint of a detached observer).  
A series of studies testing this hypothesis demonstrated that cuing people to 
analyze negative events from a self-distanced perspective (rather than a self-immersed 
perspective) led them to focus less on recounting the emotionally arousing details of their 




This shift in the content of people’s thoughts — less recounting and more reconstruing — 
in turn led them to display lower negative affect in the short term (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; 
Gruber, Harvey, & Johnson, 2009; Kross & Ayduk, 2008a; Kross, et al., 2005). Over 
time, self-distancing has been shown to buffer individuals against recurring maladaptive 
thoughts, future negative emotion, and delayed cardiovascular reactivity (Ayduk & 
Kross, 2008; Kross & Ayduk, 2008a). Benefits from taking this type of perspective when 
recalling a distressing event even extend to various vulnerable populations, such as 
children (Kross, Duckworth, Ayduk, Tsukayama, & Mischel, 2011), clinically depressed 
adults (Kross, Gard, Deldin, Clifton, & Ayduk, 2012) and people with bipolar disorder 
(Gruber, et al., 2009). 
The aforementioned findings hold regardless of whether self-distance is 
experimentally manipulated (Kross & Ayduk, 2008a; Kross, et al., 2005) or 
spontaneously activated (Ayduk & Kross, 2010b), suggesting that it is a basic mechanism 
that allows people to focus on, confront, and reconstrue negative feelings adaptively. 
However, the existing research is limited by an important consideration: all prior work on 
distancing has been performed in the context of enabling people to adaptively work-
through painful past experiences that have already occurred. Whether self-distancing 
enables people to adaptively regulate their thoughts, feelings, and behavior “in the 
moment” when faced with an acute psychological stressor remains unknown.  
Addressing this question is important because some of the most intense forms of 
distress are elicited in response to an upcoming or presently occurring event, which can 
exert harmful tolls on the individual. For example, anxiety during academic tests has 




provocation can result in anger and aggression (Bushman & Huesmann, 2010), acute 
physical pain impairs memory (Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2006), and social 
exclusion tends to increase negative affect and decrease self-control ability (Baumeister, 
DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005). Indeed, research from multiple levels of analysis 
indicates that when stress is potentiated at high levels, it often has extreme negative 
psychological, physiological, and behavioral implications (Kemeny, Gruenewald, & 
Dickerson, 2004). 
Inducing self-distance in the moment 
In addition to exploring whether people can self-distance in the moment, this 
dissertation also examines how they might do so. Prior studies in this area have mainly 
manipulated self-distance by asking participants to visualize a past negative experience 
using either an immersed (e.g., “go back to the time and place of the experience and 
relive the situation as if it were happening to you all over again…”) or distanced (e.g., 
“take a few steps back and move away from your experience…watch the conflict unfold 
as if it were happening all over again to the distant you…”) perspective while thinking 
about the reasons underlying their emotions (e.g., Kross, et al., 2005). However, visual 
perspective-taking might not lend itself to present negative experiences as it does for ones 
that have already occurred since it is probably more difficult to visualize an event that has 
not yet happened.  
Therefore, another brief and easily implemented method of inducing self-distance 
was sought, with clues uncovered in the emotion regulation and self-control literature. 
Specifically, research on expressive writing has found an inverse relationship between the 




participant’s degree of psychological distance from that event (e.g., Cohn, Mehl, & 
Pennebaker, 2004; also see Pennebaker & King, 1999). Consistent with this idea, other 
studies have shown that people led to adopt a self-distanced visual perspective on a past 
emotional (Grossmann & Kross, 2010; Kross & Ayduk, 2008b) or non-emotional 
(McIsaac & Eich, 2002) experience subsequently wrote about it using fewer first person 
pronouns than those assigned to adopt a self-immersed perspective. Additionally, a recent 
study demonstrated that more second person commands (e.g., You will…) and fewer first 
person commands (e.g., I will…) were spontaneously used by participants when 
considering hypothetical scenarios related to self-control than similar ones not demanding 
self-regulation (Zell, Warriner, & Albarracín, 2012).  
Taken together, these findings suggest a connection between the type of pronouns 
people use to refer to themselves and their self/emotion regulation ability in the face of 
distress. Perhaps when individuals reference themselves using their own name and 
pronouns other than the typical first person, they become the object of their own 
attention. This seems to imply a type of psychological distance from the self, so perhaps 
self-distance can be increased via this simple shift in language. Studies by Kross et al. 
(under revision) have provided initial evidence that this is indeed the case. These authors 
asked participants to recall an anxious experience, or, in a separate experiment, an 
unresolved anger episode, and then briefly think through their thoughts and emotions 
surrounding the event. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to use first person 
pronouns when referring to their self during this reflection while the other half were told 
to use their own name and non-first person pronouns when referring to their self. 




person pronouns subsequently showed greater self-distance, according to two visual 
perspective questions used to measure this construct in many past studies (e.g., Ayduk & 
Kross, 2010b; Grossmann & Kross, 2010; Mischkowski, Kross, & Bushman, 2012), than 
those in the first person condition. The same pronoun manipulation was employed in this 
dissertation except that participants were asked to analyze their current thoughts and 
feelings regarding an upcoming stressor instead of a past anxious or anger experience. 
Trait social anxiety 
When investigating a potential stress-buffering exercise, it is valuable to explore 
whether those most vulnerable to that type of stressor (e.g., people high in that type of 
anxiety) may benefit from the intervention. Besides being one of the most common forms 
of anxiety (e.g., Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, & Walters, 2005), fear of social 
situations is relatively simple to invoke in the laboratory, providing a high degree of 
ecological validity. For example, it seems easier to believably create an experience where 
a socially anxious person is explicitly evaluated by peers than one in which a participant 
highly anxious about heights encounters that fear in a controlled setting. Therefore, this 
dissertation examined whether self-distancing can assist people faced with a social 
stressor regardless of individual differences in trait social anxiety. 
Additionally, people high in this type of anxiety might especially benefit from a 
brief exercise designed to decrease the negative effects of acute stress. Researchers have 
theorized that an extreme consideration of how others see the self likely plays a major 
role in the activation and maintenance of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Coles, 
Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Schultz & Heimberg, 2008). 




interpreting even ambiguous cues in a threatening manner, and worry that others are 
judging them negatively (Mathews, 1990). In a vicious cycle, the worry associated with 
being seen poorly can interfere with socially anxious participants’ performance, which 
then reinforces their negative self-beliefs and contributes to maladaptive rumination 
(Brozovich & Heimberg, 2008).  
A simple intervention to help those high in social anxiety better regulate their 
negative affect prior to a social stressor, potentially reducing downstream consequences, 
thus seems highly desirable. As previously discussed, Amir and colleagues (2008, 2010) 
have been able to modify the pernicious attentional bias common among socially anxious 
individuals after only a single short retraining session, so altering their cognitive 
processes to promote emotion regulation in the face of stress may also be possible with a 
minimal technique.  
Psychological distancing seems a likely candidate for such a cognitive 
intervention considering the many studies that show a self-distanced perspective helps 
participants, even those with certain psychopathologies, adaptively cope with their 
distressing emotions (Gruber, et al., 2009; Kross & Ayduk, 2011; Kross, et al., 2012). 
However, prior work has found that socially anxious individuals typically recall 
threatening social experiences from more of an observer perspective (i.e., through their 
audience’s eyes) and less of a field perspective (i.e., through their own eyes) than 
participants low in this trait (Coles, et al., 2002; Coles, Turk, Heimberg, & Fresco, 2001; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Therefore, it could be argued that increasing self-distance 
before a social stressor might not benefit this group since they already spontaneously 




To help clarify this issue and explore potential translational implications of the 
distancing intervention before an acute stressor, trait social anxiety level was examined in 
both studies of this dissertation. If comparable benefits are found between participants in 
this vulnerable population and those low in social anxiety, then it could be prudent to 
start researching whether the incorporation of this brief self-distancing intervention into 
existing therapies may provide additional assistance. 
Trier Social Stress Task (TSST) 
In the present research, a slightly modified version of the Trier Social Stress Task 
(TSST; Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993) was used to examine the implications 
of self-distancing for adaptive behavior and emotion regulation in the face of an acute 
stressor. The TSST involves having participants deliver a public speech in front of an 
evaluative audience without receiving sufficient time to prepare. Prior work indicates that 
this task is one of the most powerful and reliable ways of inducing stress in the laboratory 
(Kemeny, et al., 2004). It has been found to elicit shame and other negative affect 
(Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004; Moons, Eisenberger, & Taylor, 2010), lead 
to rumination (Zoccola, Dickerson, & Zaldivar, 2008), and its associated anxiety often 
interferes with speech performance (Amir, et al., 2008; Menzel & Carrell, 1994). It thus 
provides a powerful means of inducing stress in the laboratory under ecologically valid 
conditions in order to examine whether psychological distance can enable people to better 
cope with ongoing sources of distress, not simply past stressful experiences.  
In addition to better allowing the generalization of self-distancing effects to 
extreme real world stressors, this paradigm provides optimal conditions for testing 




type of intervention. Considering that the TSST involves giving an impromptu speech to 
people that participants are told in advance will be judging their performance, it is 
unequivocally a stressor that is social-evaluative in nature. As would be expected from 
this type of task, participants high in social anxiety have reported feeling more 
anticipatory anxiety than those low in this trait (Jezova, Makatsori, Duncko, Moncek, & 
Jakubek, 2004). Therefore, the TSST is ideally suited for testing whether increased self-
distance helps produce more adaptive responses to acute stressors regardless of 
dispositional vulnerability. 
Overview 
In sum, this dissertation used a recently uncovered self-distancing method to 
investigate whether repercussions of acute stress can be mitigated via a brief cognitive 
reconstrual exercise, even for those that are particularly prone to anxiety. In the process, 
the studies will take a first step towards examining whether people can self-distance in 
the moment.  
In Study 1, participants were asked to either adopt a self-immersed (e.g., think 
through your current feelings using the pronoun I) or self-distanced (e.g., think through 
your current feelings using you and/or your own name when referring to yourself) 
perspective just prior to the TSST. The effectiveness of this distancing manipulation on 
common stress indicators was then examined. Specifically, participants’ speech 
performances were objectively rated and their negative affect, rumination, and regulatory 
depletion were measured following the speech task.  
Study 2 followed a similar, albeit simplified, procedure and measured challenge 




reconstrual of an anticipated stressor, a potential underlying mechanism of Study 1’s 
findings.  
Three questions were of particular focus in this dissertation: Does self-distancing 
in the face of acute stress promote more adaptive behavior, affect, and cognition? If so, 
do the benefits of this brief cognitive exercise extend to all participants regardless of their 
trait social anxiety level? Finally, might distancing exert stress buffering effects via 







Study 1 investigated whether cueing people to reflect over their feelings from a 
self-distanced perspective would lead them to exhibit more adaptive psychological (i.e., 
affect and rumination) and behavioral (i.e., speech performance) responses to the TSST. 
During this first examination of whether self-distancing can serve as an effective 
intervention against an impending acute stressor, it was important to examine dependent 
variables that have been previously demonstrated as harmful consequences of the TSST 
and similar public speaking tasks. Therefore, the implications of manipulating 
psychological distance prior to an anxiety-provoking event were examined for the 
following dimensions: 
Performance. Participants led to self-distance before the TSST were expected to give 
a more effective speech, according to objective raters, than participants asked to take a 
more immersive perspective before the stressful task. This was hypothesized because 
taking a psychological step back from the self better allows people to examine their 
thoughts and emotions regarding an unpleasant event without feeling overwhelmed, 
which makes them more able to reconstrue the experience in a way that promotes insight 
and reduces distress (for reviews, see Ayduk & Kross, 2010a; Kross & Ayduk, 2011).  
Altering initial threatening construals of the TSST, to instead appraise the upcoming 
task as more of a challenge that can be successfully met, thus may be easier for self-




appraisal theory (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985), when people face an event related to an 
important goal (e.g., having others positively evaluate the self), they consider how 
demanding or effortful it will likely be and then assess the extent of their resources for 
coping with the event. If they determine that their resources are inadequate for 
successfully meeting the situational demand, then it is appraised as a threat with great 
likelihood for loss (e.g., negative evaluation by others). However, when resources are 
deemed sufficient to cope effectively with the demands of the event, it is appraised as a 
challenge with potential for gain (e.g., increased social/self-esteem). Therefore, cognitive 
appraisals of the speech task, specifically healthier reappraisals of initial ones via self-
distancing, may contribute to better performance in this group. Additionally, because 
distanced participants should be better able to regulate their negative emotion, they may 
show less impairment in speech performance due to anticipatory anxiety (Amir, et al., 
2008; Menzel & Carrell, 1994) compared to the immersed condition. 
Shame. One of the most reliable findings associated with the TSST in prior research 
is that it potentiates negative affect, particularly shame, in participants (Dickerson, et al., 
2004). According to some researchers, humans need to belong to groups and maintain 
relationships for psychological well-being (Baumeister, et al., 2005), so, to some extent, a 
consideration of how other people see the self is likely important for fulfilling this 
evolutionary drive. Therefore, experiences that involve explicit evaluation, such as a 
public speech, feel threatening to most people, and if performance is judged poorly by 
one’s self and/or others it can result in views of the self as less worthy and capable 
(Dickerson, et al., 2004; Gruenewald, Dickerson, & Kemeny, 2007). Increased shame 




their objective social performance (Stopa & Clark, 1993; Voncken & Bögels, 2008), 
possibly because of their greater attentional bias toward threat and propensity to interpret 
ambiguous cues negatively (Mathews, May, Mogg, & Eysenck, 1990; Mathews, 
Richards, & Eysenck, 1989). 
Regardless of trait social anxiety level, however, participants induced with distance 
before the TSST are expected to report less shame afterwards since distancing has been 
found in many studies (for review, see Kross & Ayduk, 2011) to help people regulate 
negative emotion. Also, if self-distanced participants give better speeches, as 
hypothesized, they may feel less ashamed about their public performance.  
Rumination. Social evaluation can have deleterious long-term effects on mental and 
physical health via rumination, or involuntary and repetitive thinking about a distressing 
event (Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008b; Thomsen, et al., 2004; Zoccola, et al., 2008). In other words, harmful 
consequences of a social stressor may not only be a function of its anticipation and/or the 
actual experience itself, but also persistently thinking about the event after it has ended. 
For example, a person could worry about having to give a public speech the week leading 
up to it, experience stress and anxiety during the speech, and then ruminate over whether 
the performance was negatively evaluated, thus reliving the stressor even long after its 
conclusion. 
In the short term, rumination might be an adaptive response if it helps focus 
cognitive energy toward resolving a pressing issue. However, an incessant tendency to 
ruminate on a negative event, especially when thoughts do not promote resolution (e.g., 




One study found that young adults with a greater tendency to ruminate reported poorer 
physical health a year later (Thomsen, et al., 2004), which lends support to the theory that 
unproductive rumination can lead to immune dysregulation over time (Brosschot, et al., 
2006). Also, excessive rumination has been considered a transdiagnostic risk factor for 
several psychological disorders, including depression, anxiety, and binge eating/drinking 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008a). 
As prior work has shown, inducing self-distance reduces rumination through the 
promotion of reconstruing, instead of recounting, a negative experience (for review, see 
Kross & Ayduk, 2011). People do the latter when they unproductively rehash details or 
only focus on the sequence of events (e.g., What was said to me? How did I feel?). 
Conversely, people reconstrue when they adopt a healthier perspective than they 
otherwise would on an experience, try to gain insight into the underlying causes of their 
negative emotions, or have realizations that assist with feelings of closure, consequently 
reducing future distress over the event (Ayduk & Kross, 2010a, 2010b; Kross, et al., 
2005). 
It was therefore hypothesized that self-distanced participants would ruminate less 
after their speech than participants not led to distance before the TSST, both overall and 
in the form of less recounting and more reconstruing of their experience. Since people 
tend to recount somewhat more even when distanced (Ayduk & Kross, 2010), 
reconstruing ratings were subtracted from recounting ratings in this study to obtain an 
overall rumination score, as has been done in prior research (e.g., Ayduk & Kross, 2008; 




greater rumination over speech task performance, and specifically more recounting 
compared to reconstruing of the stressful event. 
Resource Depletion. According to some researchers, acts requiring inhibition of 
natural tendencies draw on a person’s limited supply of self-regulatory resources, and 
self-control becomes more difficult when these resources are depleted (Bauer & 
Baumeister, 2011; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). Effortful self-presentation, which 
characterizes the TSST, has been found to be especially depleting (Vohs, Baumeister, & 
Ciarocco, 2005). Therefore, this study was also interested in examining whether 
psychological distancing, which promotes acts of self-control (e.g., Fujita, Trope, 
Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Kross, et al., 2005), could reduce resource depletion due 
to a stressful social task. Besides delivering a difficult speech, attempting to regulate 
negative affect and ruminative thought content is effortful and likely consumes limited 
resources. However, self-distanced participants are expected find such self-regulation 
easier and thus show less regulatory depletion by the end of the study compared to those 
in the immersed condition.   
Causal Pathway. In addition to predicting main effects, the dependent variables were 
expected to be causally linked. Specifically, self-distancing was hypothesized to lead 
participants to perform better on the speech task, which would cause them to experience 
less shame, which would then lead them to ruminate less. Because depletion could be 
driven by speech performance, shame, and/or rumination, there was no prediction about 
which of these variables would mediate the condition effect on depletion.  
Social Anxiety. Several recent studies have found that clinical populations can benefit 




after distanced visualization of a past event compared to the immersed group, and 
sometimes show greater benefit than non-clinical participants that self-distance (Gruber, 
et al., 2009; Kross, et al., 2012; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011). Importantly, self-
distancing does not promote the avoidance of negative emotions, which would undermine 
its therapeutic potential (Ayduk & Kross, 2010b). Although this distancing research has 
focused exclusively on people with depression and bipolar disorder, similar results for 
socially anxious participants were expected in Study 1.  
Some may consider an intervention designed to increase distance from the self 
inappropriate for socially anxious individuals since they tend to adopt an observer’s 
viewpoint when envisioning themselves engaged in a social situation (Coles, et al., 2001; 
Schultz & Heimberg, 2008). However, visualizing a negative experience from the 
perspective of a fly on the wall, a distance induction used in several past studies (e.g., 
Kross, et al., 2005; Kross, et al., 2011) seems different than imagining that event from the 
perspective of someone potentially evaluating the self. In the former case, a person takes 
in the whole scene more detachedly by observing the self, all those present, and the 
surrounding environment. Seeing this broader context likely makes it easier to cope with 
overwhelming affect and reconstrue the experience compared to a narrow focus on the 
self when visualization occurs through the audience’s eyes. Additionally, taking the view 
of someone observing the self probably leads to a greater consideration of how one is 
being evaluated, presumably enhancing social anxiety, compared to adopting a 
perspective that is neither of a specific person in the situation nor one’s own. 
Using non-first person pronouns and one’s name to refer to the self during 




beneficial for this vulnerable group than distancing via visual perspective taking, though. 
Not only is non-typical pronoun use during self-reflection less likely to be confused by 
socially anxious individuals with the observer’s perspective that they habitually use, it 
also better lends itself to distancing before a social stressor since it could be difficult to 
visualize an event that hasn’t happened. 
By examining the implications of psychological distance for each of the variables just 
outlined, this study hopes to show that taking a self-distanced perspective before 
engaging in one of the most potent laboratory stressors helps to boost speech 
performance, in addition to decreasing shame, rumination, and self-regulatory resource 
depletion. Furthermore, Study 1 seeks to demonstrate that distancing in the moment has 
these beneficial effects regardless of a person’s trait social anxiety level.  
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 89 undergraduates (60 females; 73% White, 12.4% Asian-
American, 6.7% African-American, 7.9% other; Mage = 19.01, SDage = 1.04) who came 
into the laboratory individually and received course credit or $20 for participating. The 
University of Michigan Institutional Review Board approved all procedures.  
Phase 1: Pre-test session  
Participants completed two types of measures during the pre-test session, which 
took place at least one day prior to the experiment (range = 1-9 days, M = 3.66, SD = 
1.76). First, participants were asked to squeeze a challenging hand grip (commonly used 
to exercise the hand and forearm) for as long as possible (Msec = 33.97, SDsec = 21.28). 




squeezed can indicate the extent of their self-regulatory depletion (e.g., Vohs, et al., 
2005). According to these researchers, it takes self-control to overcome the natural 
impulse to release one’s grip when the hand quickly tires, so the more depleted a person 
is, the less he or she is able to persevere at the task. This measure was given to 
participants at the end of the experimental session to investigate whether the self-
distancing intervention reduced regulatory depletion associated with the TSST.  
However, because individuals may significantly differ in their characteristic self-
regulatory ability and hand/forearm strength, the length of time participants could 
squeeze the hand grip was measured in this pre-test session to obtain a baseline 
assessment.   
Second, they completed a series of individual difference questionnaires that 
measured trait constructs theoretically relevant to the current research (i.e., worry, 
depression, and brooding rumination). The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
(Leary, 1983) was included to assess participants’ trait level of social anxiety (α = .88, M 
= 36.02, SD = 8.13). The 12 items on this measure (e.g., “I am afraid that others will not 
approve of me” and “Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other people think 
of me”) were rated by participants using a 5-point scale (1 = not at all characteristic of 
me, 5 = extremely characteristic of me). 
Phase 2: Experiment  
Baseline affect. After providing informed consent, participants rated how they 
felt “right now” on a 7-point scale (1 = very negative, 7 = very positive) to provide a 




Stress induction. The experimenter then introduced the speech task. Following 
established procedures (Kirschbaum, et al., 1993) participants were told that they would 
be required to give a speech on why they feel they are qualified for their “dream” job to a 
panel of interviewers trained to evaluate speech performance. They were also told that 
their performance would be videotaped so that it could be later assessed for experimental 
purposes. Participants were then taken to a small room that contained only a desk and a 
chair, and were left alone for five minutes to prepare their speech. To further increase the 
stressful nature of this task, they were not permitted to make any written notes during this 
time.  
Experimental manipulation. After the speech preparation period, the 
experimenter told participants, “Besides preparing the content of a speech, people also 
need to prepare themselves psychologically before giving a speech, so we are interested 
in learning about the different ways people go about preparing themselves to give a 
speech and what effect each type of self-preparation has on their performance.” 
Participants were then randomly assigned to reflect on their current thoughts and feelings 
from a self-immersed or a self-distanced perspective. Those in the self-immersed group 
were told that some people report thinking through their feelings using the pronoun I, and 
were asked to do this when thinking about their emotions. Participants in self-distanced 
group were instead told that some people report thinking through their feelings using 
their own name and non first-person pronouns (e.g., he or she, you), and were asked to do 
this when thinking about their emotions. All participants were asked to explore their 




underlying causes and reasons for your feelings?”) using I (or you and their own name) 
for three minutes (see appendix for full scripts).  
Speech task. Next, the experimenter returned and led participants into another 
room where they delivered their 5-minute speech in front of two confederates posing as 
speech evaluators. These “evaluators” had been coached to maintain a neutral expression 
throughout the speeches, neither smiling nor frowning, to prevent influencing 
participants’ perception of whether their performance was being judged positively or 
negatively. Furthermore, professional work attire was worn to increase their authority as 
trained speech evaluators. They occasionally wrote notes on an “evaluation form” to 
enhance believability and appear engaged, but they did not say anything to the 
participant. A video camera was positioned between the evaluators, approximately 10 
feet directly in front of participants, to record their performance.  
Speech performance. Two coders, blind to the study hypotheses and condition, 
later watched the videotapes of participants’ speeches and rated them on three 
dimensions, confidence, nervousness, and overall performance, using a 1 (below average) 
to 5 (above average) scale. After reversing nervousness scores, coders’ ratings were 
consistent across these dimensions (Rater 1:  = .90; Rater 2:  = .92). Therefore, all 
three dimensions were collapsed to create a single speech performance index for each 
coder. These two combined performance scores were also highly correlated (r = .75, p < 
.001).Thus they were collapsed to form a single speech performance rating for each 
participant (M = 3.38, SD = .83).  
Self-reported shame. After participants delivered their speeches, they completed 




Sanftner, & Tangney, 1994), which were embedded among a few filler questionnaires. 
This study focused specifically on how the intervention influenced shame because prior 
research indicates that shame is the key emotion elicited by social-evaluative tasks like 
public speaking (Dickerson, et al., 2004). Participants were asked to rate the five shame 
(e.g., “I want to sink into the floor and disappear”) and five pride (e.g., “I feel capable, 
useful”) subscale items with respect to their current feelings on a 1 (not feeling this way 
at all) to 5 (feeling this way very strongly) scale. Responses to these items were averaged 
after reverse scoring the pride ratings, with higher scores reflecting greater state shame ( 
= .90; M = 2.03, SD = .72).  
Rumination. The experimenter then told participants that the next phase of the 
study was still being set up in a separate room, and asked them to wait quietly for about 
five minutes in their cubicle until it was ready. This minor deception was included to 
allow participants an opportunity to ruminate over their speech performance (for a similar 
approach to assessing rumination, see Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Gerin, Davidson, 
Christenfeld, Goyal, & Schwartz, 2006; Zoccola, et al., 2008). Their bags and phones had 
been placed out of easy reach at the beginning of the study, so participants presumably 
did not have anything to do during this time but think. 
 The degree to which participants ruminated during this five-minute period was 
subsequently assessed in two ways. First, they were asked to describe in writing the 
stream of thoughts that had flowed through their mind while waiting for the experimenter 
to return. Prior research has linked the tendency to ruminate maladaptively over negative 
experiences with higher levels of recounting and lower levels of reconstruing (Ayduk & 




participants’ condition and the study hypotheses, later coded these essays for the extent to 
which they contained recounting and reconstruing statements using a 0 (not at all) to 4 
(completely) scale. Recounting was operationalized as statements in which participants 
recalled the specific chain of events and emotions that they had experienced during the 
speech task (e.g., “I was feeling nervous and fidgeted a lot while I was speaking”). 
Reconstruing was operationalized as statements in which participants described 
beneficial insights or realizations about their task experience (e.g., “I was only given five 
minutes to prepare my speech, and was thus almost set up to not do well”). Inter-rater 
reliability was high for recounting ( = .88; M = 1.13, SD = 1.34) and reconstruing ( = 
.90; M = .49, SD = .81), and scores on these dimensions were significantly correlated (r = 
.45, p < .001). Thus reconstruing scores were subtracted from recounting scores to form a 
single rumination index, with higher scores reflecting a greater tendency to recount rather 
than reconstrue the speech task (M = .63, SD = 1.21).  
Second, after participants wrote the free-response essay, they completed the 
Rumination Questionnaire (RQ; Mellings & Alden, 2000), which was slightly modified 
to apply to a speech task rather than an uncomfortable social interaction ( = .70; M = 
3.65, SD = 1.11). This questionnaire prompted participants to consider their thoughts 
since the task, and then asked five questions to assess their tendency to brood over the 
experience (e.g., “To what extent did you criticize yourself about not handling the speech 
task well?” and “To what extent did you think about the anxiety you felt while giving 
your speech?”) on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) scale. 
Resource depletion.  After these two rumination measures, participants were 




19.96). Following past research (Vohs, et al., 2005), a self-regulatory resource depletion 
score was computed by subtracting the seconds participants kept the hand grip closed 
during this assessment from the amount of time they squeezed it during their  pre-test 
session. To reduce the skew of depletion before analyses (skew = 1.72), the distribution 
was Winsorized so that scores higher than the 95th percentile (n = 4) were rescored into 
95% values (Msec = 5.67, SDsec = 15.98).  
Results 
Preliminary analyses. The self-distanced (n = 44) and self-immersed (n = 45) 
groups were matched on age (F(1, 88) = .51, p > .47), gender (Χ
2
(88) =  .76) and race 
(Χ
2
(89) = .26), as well as the theoretically relevant individual difference measures (i.e., 
worry, depression, and brooding rumination; Fs < 1.38, ps > .24), indicating that random 
assignment was successful. None of these individual differences, including gender (Fs < 
1.33, ps > .25), interacted with condition to predict any of the dependent variables (Fs < 
1.5, ps > .13), and controlling for them did not substantively alter the results. Therefore, 
only trait social anxiety will be reviewed further to explore the theoretical implications 
previously discussed.   
According to Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scores, trait social anxiety was similar 
between groups (F < .50, p > .48), and did not interact with condition to predict any 
dependent variables (Fs < 1.07, ps > .42). Baseline mood also did not significantly 
interact with condition on any of the results (Fs < 1.98, ps > .08
*
), or differ between  
___________ 
*
Baseline mood marginally interacted with condition to predict shame such that distanced 
participants reported lower stress/anxiety than immersed overall, with this difference 




conditions (F < .07, p > .79). Both of these measures showed a relationship to several 
dependent variables, however, so they were included as covariates in all General Linear 
Models (GLM) analyses performed to examine the effects of condition on objective 
speech performance, shame, rumination, and regulatory depletion. Degrees of freedom 
vary slightly across analyses because of omitted responses.  
Speech performance. According to the overall performance score of the two 
speech raters, self-distanced participants gave better speeches (M = 3.60, SD = .78) than 
those in the immersed group (M = 3.17, SD = .85; F(1, 83) = 5.74, p = .02, ηp
2
 = .065). 
Neither baseline mood (F(1, 83) = 1.19, p = .28, ηp
2
 = .014) nor trait social anxiety (F(1, 
83) = .22, p = .64., ηp
2
 = .003) predicted this variable. 
Shame. Following their speech, individuals in the distanced condition reported feeling 
significantly less shame
 
(M = 1.81, SD = .68) compared to participants in the immersed 
condition (M = 2.25, SD = .70; F(1, 82) = 8.49, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .094). The two subscales 
comprising this measure showed a similar significant pattern when analyzed separately; 
the distanced group scored lower on the shame subscale (M = 1.40, SD = .58) than the 
immersed (M = 1.71, SD = .65; F(1, 82) = 4.96, p = .03, ηp
2
 = .057), and distanced 
participants reported more pride (M = 3.80, SD = .89) than the immersed condition (M = 
3.21, SD = .88; F(1, 82) = 8.84, p = .004, ηp
2
 = .097). Baseline mood did not predict this 
variable (F(1, 82) = .46, p = .50, ηp
2
 = .006), but trait social anxiety positively predicted 
shame (F(1, 82) = 5.20, p = .03, ηp
2
 = .60; pr(82) = .24, p = .03). 
Rumination. Additionally, self-distanced participants demonstrated less 
recounting compared to reconstruing (M = .33, SD = 1.03) in their free-response 




6.65, p < .02, ηp
2
 = .075). Neither baseline mood (F(1, 82) = .03, p = .87, ηp
2
 < .001), nor 
trait social anxiety (F(1, 82) = .03, p = .86, ηp
2
 < .001), predicted this assessment of 
ruminative thought content.  
Supporting this finding, participants in the distanced condition scored marginally 
lower on the modified RQ (M = 3.47, SD = 1.01) than those in the immersed group (M = 
3.91, SD = 1.13; F(1, 81)  = 3.40, p = .07, ηp
2
 = .040). Trait social anxiety positively 
predicted self-reported rumination (F(1, 81) = 6.28, p < .02, ηp
2
 = .072; pr(81) = .27, p < 




Regulatory depletion. Finally, self-distanced participants showed less self-
regulatory resource depletion (Msec = 2.29, SDsec = 16.29) than those in the immersed 
condition (Msec = 9.38, SDsec = 15.23; F(1, 83) = 4.39, p = .04, ηp
2 
= .050). Neither 
baseline mood (F(1, 83) = .29, p = .59, ηp
2
 = .003), nor trait social anxiety (F(1, 83) = 
.02, p = .90, ηp
2
 < .001) predicted depletion. 
Path analyses. The causal pathway underlying the effects of the self-distancing 
manipulation on the dependent variables was next examined. Preliminary analyses 
indicated that depletion scores were not significantly related to any of the dependent 
variables (see Table 1). Therefore, the indirect effects between condition and this variable 
were not examined. Instead, two models were performed to test the hypothesis that the 
link between condition and shame would be mediated by speech performance and that 
speech performance would, in turn, predict rumination: (a) one model in which the 
effects of condition on rumination were fully mediated (i.e., no direct effects between 




that included direct effects between condition and each of the dependent variables. Since 
the two rumination measures were highly correlated (r = .55, p < .001), they were 
averaged together for these analyses after standardizing scores on both measures. 
The partial mediation model fit the data well (χ
2
(4, N = 89) = .53, p = .97; CFI = 
1.0; SRMR = .02; RMSEA = .00; 90% confidence interval = .00 to .00; see Figure 1) and  
significantly better than the full mediation model (Δχ²(2) = 9.11, p = .01), which did not 
fit the data well (χ
2
 (6, N = 89) = 9.64, p = .14; CFI = .87; SRMR = .09; RMSEA = .08; 
90% confidence interval = .00 to .18). Following the recommendations of Taylor, 
MacKinnon, and Tein (2008), a joint significance test was used to examine the indirect 
effect of the partial mediation model, which was found to be significant. In other words, 
distancing bolstered subsequent speech performance, which led these participants to 
experience lower shame, which then resulted in less rumination over performance in this 
group. Additionally, self-distancing helped reduce both feelings of shame and unhealthy 
ruminative thought directly, without the previous influence of better performance and/or 
lower shame. 
Discussion 
Given the frequency with which people encounter stressful experiences in daily 
life, it is important to find a brief minimal intervention that can increase their capacity to 
regulate maladaptive responses to such events. In an attempt to meet this challenge, a 
simple and theoretically motivated self-distancing manipulation was examined in Study 
1. Evidence, both psychological and behavioral, was found to support the hypothesis that 
increased psychological distance helps to buffer against the typical negative effects of an 




Specifically, compared to the immersed condition, participants who reflected over 
their thoughts and feelings from a self-distanced perspective prior to delivering a public 
speech, one of the most reliable ways for researchers to induce stress (Kemeny, et al., 
2004), felt lower shame after their performance, experienced less unhealthy rumination 
about the task, and were not as depleted of regulatory resources by the end of the study. 
Perhaps most noteworthy, the speech performance of distanced participants was rated as 
objectively better than those in the immersed group. This latter finding suggests that, all 
other things being equal about participants who self-distanced versus self-immersed, 
those in the former group would have seemed more impressive during a real job 
interview.  
The path analysis bolsters the idea that individuals in the distanced group 
experienced less shame than self-immersed participants in large part because they 
performed better on the speech task. Reductions in shame then partially explained why 
self-distanced participants ruminated less at the end of the experiment. In contrast, none 
of the assessed variables mediated the relationship between condition and depletion, 
possibly because depletion is somewhat more “implicit” than the other, more “explicit”, 
variables.  
Implications for self-distancing theory 
These findings extend research on self-distancing in two ways. First, prior studies 
in this area have focused exclusively on the role that increased self-distance plays in 
allowing people to adaptively work-through negative past experiences. An examination 
of whether people can distance in the moment to regulate anticipatory stress has been 




people can self-distance in this context, resulting in a mitigation of the negative short-
term psychological and behavioral consequences of acute stress. Just as increasing 
psychological distance facilitates coping with past events, it also seems an effective way 
to adaptively manage current stressors.  
Although no research prior to Study 1 had examined how people can self-distance 
in the moment to regulate anticipatory stress, a recent experiment performed by an 
independent laboratory conceptually replicated these findings (Kross, Bruehlman-
Senecal, Park, Burson, et al., under revision). Specifically, after learning they would be 
interacting with a stranger and evaluated on the positive impression that they made, a 
common method of inducing social anxiety in the lab (e.g., Clark & Arkowitz, 1975; 
Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982; Turner, Beidel, & Larkin, 1986), participants 
were asked to engage in either the distanced or immersed form of self-reflection used in 
Study 1.  Independent judges blind to condition and hypotheses later watched tapes of the 
social interaction and rated participants’ nervousness, amount of eye contact, speech 
length, and verbal/non-verbal signs of discomfort. As found in Study 1, participants 
asked to use their own name and other non-first person pronouns while thinking through 
their thoughts and feelings concerning the upcoming stressor performed significantly 
better overall on the task than participants asked to use first person pronouns when 
referring to their self during preparation. Distanced participants also reported a 
significantly greater decrease in anxiety, from before to after the social interaction, 
compared to those in the immersed condition. Thus, both studies demonstrate that self-




on the self can highly benefit people’s behavioral and emotional reactions to a social 
stressor. 
Study 1 of this dissertation also demonstrated that a relatively novel technique for 
inducing self-distance, simply thinking through thoughts and emotions using one’s own 
name and other non-first person pronouns for a few minutes, can be effectively applied to 
distancing “in the moment”. Together with the finding by Kross and colleagues (under 
revision), that pronoun use while reflecting on a past negative event affects distance 
scores on an established measure, this study suggests that thinking about one’s self using 
pronouns other than “I” increases psychological distance, which then assists task 
performance and emotion regulation.  
Implications for theory and treatment of anxiety 
Importantly, none of the findings in Study 1 were moderated by participants’ trait 
social anxiety level since scores on this measure did not interact with condition to predict 
any of the dependent variables. This is consistent with results from the social interaction 
study by Kross and colleagues (under revision) previously described; trait social anxiety 
did not moderate distanced participants’ greater decline in anxiety level or overall 
interaction performance. 
This technique to increase self-distance thus appears to be effective for 
participants regardless of their social anxiety level, which has two main implications. 
First, it supports the idea that distancing before an acute stressor can provide buffering 
effects even for people most vulnerable to being overwhelmed with negative affect and 
rumination. Second, the lack of moderation by trait social anxiety challenges the notion 




group since they automatically adopt an observer’s perspective on these types of 
stressors, a likely contributor to their anxiety (e.g., Coles, et al., 2001; Schultz & 
Heimberg, 2008). Study 1 seems to show that taking this observer’s perspective is not 
equivalent to increasing self-distance via the use of one’s own name and non-first person 
pronouns during emotional reflection. If they were, than highly anxious participants in 
the distanced condition should have demonstrated a lot less behavioral, cognitive, and 
emotional benefit than distanced participants low in this trait. Although Trope and 
colleagues have found various psychological distancing techniques to be substitutable 
(for review, see Trope & Liberman, 2010), this study suggests that different distancing 
methods may be more or less helpful, depending on the circumstances. At least for 
situations involving social evaluation, manipulations which involve the working through 
of thoughts and emotions using one’s own name and non-first person pronouns likely 
promotes self-distance better for socially anxious individuals than the visual perspective 
manipulation used in most prior self-distancing studies. Because of their similarity, 
participants high in this trait may find it difficult to overcome their harmful propensity to 
see themselves through an audience member’s eyes when they are asked to take the 
perspective of a detached observer or a fly on the wall.  
Remaining questions 
Two main questions linger after Study 1. First, what psychological mechanisms 
mediate the effects of self-distancing on affect, behavior, and cognition? Modifying how 
a person construes physical arousal has been shown to assist adaptive coping with stress 
in forms of Cognitive Therapy (Gould, et al., 1995), and prior research indicates that 




better and show less distress (Jamieson, et al., 2011; Jamieson, Mendes, Blackstock, & 
Schmader, 2010). Might distancing prior to the TSST affect performance, emotion, 
rumination and/or depletion through a reappraisal mechanism?  Although it was 
anticipated that cognitive appraisals, specifically healthier reappraisals of initial ones via 
distancing, would contribute to the results, they were not measured in Study 1. It was 
feared that including cognitive assessments between the manipulation and the speech task 
would disrupt the self-distance induction, thereby preventing any potential effects. 
Therefore, after determining that increased self-distance can serve as an effective 
intervention against an upcoming stressor in Study 1, the possible role of cognitive 
appraisals in this process was investigated in Study 2. 
 Second, could distancing actually have had a neutral effect, and only appeared 
beneficial in Study 1 because of potential extreme harmfulness from the self-immersion 
manipulation? Since the first study lacked a comparison group for the two conditions, 
Study 2 will seek support for the notion that self-distancing, not self-immersion, is 
primarily driving the uncovered effects.   
 The second study of this dissertation sought to address these questions, 
hopefully aiding knowledge of how people can harness this brief cognitive intervention to 
strategically regulate stress responses that may undermine their well-being. To better 
understand how self-distancing contributes to improved speech performance and the 
other positive downstream effects found in Study 1, Study 2 measured participants’ 
cognitive appraisals following the manipulation. Additionally, to help rule out the 
possibility that Study 1 results could be due to impairment from self-focusing (in the 




control condition as well as distanced and immersed groups. This third condition did not 
receive any self-preparation instructions for the manipulation period, so these participants 









                                                                                                                             
CHAPTER 3 
Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to extend the findings from Study 1 by exploring cognitive 
appraisals as a potential mechanism underlying the beneficial effects of self-distancing in 
the face of a potent stressor.  
Challenge versus threat appraisals. The way that people interpret their 
experiences can strongly affect how they psychologically and behaviorally respond 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Ford & Collins, 2010; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). This seems 
especially true for ambiguous (e.g., Collins & Feeney, 2004; Mathews, et al., 1989) and 
social-evaluative tasks (for review, see Dickerson, et al., 2004), both of which 
characterize the TSST since evaluators convey only a neutral expression during the 
speech. If people construe situational demands to be beyond their ability to cope, then 
they appraise it as a threat according cognitive appraisal theory (Folkman & Lazarus, 
1985). Conversely, when people believe that they have enough resources to effectively 
deal with an event, they appraise it as more of a challenge than a threat, potentially even 
seeing it as an opportunity to gain esteem, mastery, or personal growth (e.g., Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1985; Jamieson, et al., 2011). Compared with challenge appraisals, viewing 
experiences as a threat is more associated with negative emotional reactions (Fischer, 
Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990; Folkman & Lazarus, 1985), including greater stress and 





Participants tend to appraise the TSST as more of a threat than a challenge 
(Harvey, Nathens, Bandiera, & LeBlanc, 2010), and specifically find it threatening to 
their social self-esteem since their performance is viewed and evaluated by others 
(Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Those with a socially anxious personality likely appraise 
these types of events as even higher in threat and lower in challenge because they 
typically interpret ambiguous environmental cues with a negative bias (Mathews, et al., 
1990; Mathews, et al., 1989). 
Encouragingly, previous research has found that it is possible to alter people’s 
appraisal of a difficult task with a minimal intervention (Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & 
Ernst, 1997). This study randomly assigned participants to hear recorded instructions for 
an upcoming arithmetic test framed as either a threat (i.e., speed and accuracy are very 
important because that is how your responses will be evaluated) or a challenge (i.e., think 
of the task as a challenge that you are capable of meeting). This manipulation was only 
about 45 seconds long, but participants in the challenge condition subsequently reported 
thinking that the math test would be less demanding, and felt better able to cope with the 
task, compared to those that heard instructions encouraging threat appraisal. 
Although this study valuably showed that altering challenge and threat appraisals 
is feasible, listening to a recorded message each time a stressful experience presents itself 
is not. Therefore, a brief method that increases one’s ability to self-initiate reappraisal of 
a distressing event, so that it is viewed a less of a threat as more of a challenge, would be 
beneficial. As self-distancing promotes the reconstrual of past negative experiences in a 
healthier way (Kross & Ayduk, 2011), this type of intervention may better allow people, 




adaptively reappraise an upcoming stressor. The finding in Study 1 that distanced 
participants reconstrued their speech experience more than those in the self-immersed 
condition, despite trait social anxiety levels, also points toward this possibility. However, 
since this cognitive assessment was given after the stressor, conclusions for anticipatory 
appraisals were prevented.  
Therefore, Study 2 sought to investigate whether inducing self-distance would 
lead people to adopt lower threat and greater challenge appraisals of an expected acute 
stressor. This advantageous reappraisal was hypothesized to occur more in distanced 
participants of this study, regardless of their individual differences in social anxiety, than 
those not led to self-distance after learning about an upcoming public speaking task. 
Following an explanation of the TSST, participants prepared their speech for a few 
minutes, and then self-distance and self-immersion were induced in the same manner as 
Study 1. Participants assigned to a third condition were just asked to wait quietly during 
the manipulation period. Immediately afterwards, all participants rated how demanding 
they thought their upcoming speech would be, the extent they felt able to cope with the 
task, and how stressed/anxious they were at the moment.  
Although participants were led to believe that they would be doing the TSST after 
these assessments, they didn’t actually perform this task in Study 2. As previously 
mentioned, completing explicit appraisal measures could interfere with a self-distanced 
state, thereby reducing or eliminating the effects from the distance induction. 
Specifically, by asking distanced participants for concrete ratings of what they are 
currently thinking and feeling, their focus might shift from the broader analysis of why 




stress due to the TSST is a well-established phenomenon (e.g., Kirschbaum, et al., 1993), 
so leading participants to believe that an evaluated performance will occur should be 
sufficient for investigating whether cognitive appraisals are an underlying mechanism of 
the stress buffering effects from self-distancing uncovered in Study 1.  
This was the main goal of Study 2, which anticipated that the distanced group 
would rate the expected speech task as the least demanding, feel best able to cope with it, 
and report the lowest stress/anxiety. Without any specific instructions, control 
participants were expected to self-prepare in whatever way came naturally to them, and 
thus show results similar to those in the immersed group since most people spontaneously 
take a more immersed perspective during self-reflection (Ayduk & Kross, 2010b). 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 70 undergraduates (50 females; 52.9% White, 28.6% Asian-
American, 12.9% African-American, 5.7% other; Mage = 20.34, SDage = 4.43) who came 
to the laboratory individually for both sessions and received $20 for their time. The 
University of Michigan Institutional Review Board approved all procedures.  
Phase 1: Pre-test session  
Participants completed the same series of individual difference questionnaires that 
were given in the pre-test session of Study 1, including the Brief Fear of Negative 
Evaluation Scale (M = 2.74, SD = 0.90). However, participants did not squeeze a 
handgrip during this session as they had in the previous study to measure baseline self-




Study 1, including regulatory depletion, made little sense in this second study given the 
causal pathway (see figure 1) previously found and the absence of an actual speech 
performance in Study 2.  
Phase 2: Experiment  
The procedure of this study was similar to that of Study 1, but with a few changes. 
After signing and rating their baseline mood on the same 7-point scale (1 = very negative, 
7= very positive; M = 4.94, SD = 1.09) participants were introduced to the speech task by 
the experimenter. The same instructions were given, although participants were only 
allowed three minutes to mentally plan their speech instead of five to increase their 
feelings of unpreparedness and stress.  
In addition to the same distanced and immersed conditions used in Study 1, a no-
instruction control group was included in Study 2. Participants randomly assigned to this 
third condition were not asked to think through their thoughts and feelings with regard to 
their upcoming speech using either first person or non-first person pronouns. They were 
only told by the experimenter to, “Please wait quietly while I set up the next part of the 
study. I will return in about 3 minutes”. It was anticipated that adding this control 
condition would allow confirmation that the effects found in Study 1 were due to benefits 
from self-distancing rather than impairment from self-focusing in the immersed 
condition. 
 At the end of the three minute manipulation period, the experimenter returned 
and asked participants to answer the following questions using a 5-point rating scale: 
“How demanding do you expect the upcoming speech task will be?” (1 = not very 




you will be able to cope with the speech task?” (1 = not very well, 5 = extremely well; M 
= 3.20, SD = .92). These measures of threat and challenge cognitive appraisal, 
respectively, have been used in previous studies and nicely reflect Lazarus and 
Folkman’s (1985) theory that appraisals result from assessments of situational demands 
and personal coping resources (e.g., Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Tomaka & Blascovich, 
1994). Participants also rated how stressed/anxious they felt about the upcoming speech 
task on the same 5-point scale (1 = not very stressed/anxious, 5 = extremely 
stressed/anxious; M = 3.50, SD = .93). As previously discussed, threat appraisals of an 
event are associated with feeling more stress and anxiety compared to holding challenge 
appraisals (e.g., Gaab, et al., 2005; Tomaka, et al., 1993). Therefore, it was hoped that 
these three questions would allow the investigation of whether cognitive appraisals may 
serve as a mechanism underlying the adaptive self-distancing effects seen in Study 1.  
Participants provided their ratings to the measures described above on a piece of 
paper, along with their response to a final question, “Please describe the stream of 
thoughts that flowed through your mind as you tried to think through your thoughts and 
feelings regarding the upcoming speech a few moments ago” if they were in the distanced 
or immersed conditions. Participants in the control condition instead saw this prompt as, 
“Please describe the stream of thoughts that flowed through your mind as you waited for 
the experimenter to return to start the speech.” This short essay was included to ascertain 
whether the manipulation instructions were correctly followed. Participants were asked to 
seal the paper with their responses to these 4 items in a blank envelope to increase their 




After participants were probed for doubts and suspicions regarding the study, the 
experimenter told them that there was actually no speech task; they were just led to 
believe that so stress and anxiety would occur, which was necessary for testing the 
experimental predictions. Participants were then fully debriefed and dismissed.  
Results 
 Preliminary analyses. Prior to analyses, one participant was excluded for failing 
to follow the manipulation instructions. Additionally, two participants did not report their 
baseline mood, so their missing values were replaced with the average score for this 
variable. Neither action significantly altered any of the results.  
No significant differences were found between the immersed (n = 25), distanced 





(70) = .94), or relevant individual difference measures (Fs < .8, ps > .50), 
implying successful random assignment. Again, individual difference measures did not 
interact with condition to predict any dependent variables (Fs < 1.65, ps > .15), so only 
trait social anxiety and baseline mood were controlled for in the General Linear Models 
(GLM) analyses below. The three groups were matched on trait social anxiety (F(2, 67) = 
1.65, p = .20), however, the immersed condition reported marginally more positive 
baseline mood than the control condition prior to the start of procedures (F (2, 67) = 2.91, 
p = .06, ηp
2
 = .08). As in Study 1, trait social anxiety did not interact with condition to 
predict any of the dependent variables when both were included as independent variables 
in the analyses (Fs < .82, ps > .64). 
 Threat appraisal. Following the manipulation, participants in the distanced 




SD = .95) compared to those in the immersed (M = 3.74, SD = .75) or control (M = 3.50, 
SD = .69) groups (F(2, 61) = 2.81, p = .068, ηp
2
 = .084). Planned contrasts for this 
variable showed that only the immersed and distanced conditions were significantly 
different from each other (t(63) = -2.18, p = .03). Neither baseline affect (F(1, 61) = .78, 
p = .38, ηp
2
 =.013) nor trait social anxiety (F(1, 61) = 2.45, p = .12, ηp
2
 = .039) predicted 
threat appraisal.  
Challenge appraisal. Distanced participants also reported greater challenge 
appraisal of the expected task (M = 3.35, SD = .98) than those in the immersed (M = 3.26, 
SD = .81) and control (M = 2.95, SD = .95) conditions, though this difference did not 
reach conventional levels of statistical significance (F(2, 61) = .42, p = .66, ηp
2
 = .014). 
Trait social anxiety negatively predicted challenge appraisal (F(1, 61) = 4.90, p = .03, ηp
2
 
= .074; pr(62) = -.28, p = .03), however, the effect of baseline mood on this variable was 
not significant (F(1, 61) = .62, p = .43, ηp
2
 = .010). 
Stress/anxiety. Participants in the distanced condition reported feeling less 
stress/anxiety over having to perform the speech (M = 3.26, SD = 1.05) than those in the 
immersed (M = 3.70, SD = .97) or control (M = 3.55, SD = .69) groups. Despite a 
medium effect size, the mean differences for this variable also failed to attain statistical 
significance (F(2, 61) = 1.77, p = .18, ηp
2
 = .055). Although the effect of baseline affect 
was not significant (F(1, 61) = 1.18, p = .28, ηp
2
 = .019), trait social anxiety positively 
predicted state stress/anxiety (F(1, 61) = 5.77, p < .02, ηp
2
 = .086; pr(62) = .30, p = .02). 
 Since the stress/anxiety question was strongly correlated with the threat appraisal 
item (r = .50, p < .001) and could be considered an additional way to assess the degree 




the two items were averaged (M = 3.49, SD = .76) in secondary analyses. Distanced 
participants scored significantly lower on this combined threat index (M = 3.24, SD = 
.84) than those in the immersed (M = 3.72, SD = .80) and control conditions (M = 3.53, 
SD = .55; F(2, 61) = 3.14, p = .05, ηp
2
 = .093). Planned contrasts for this composite 
variable revealed a significant difference between the distanced and immersed groups 
only (t(63) = -2.17, p = .03). Baseline mood was not a predictor of overall threat appraisal 
(F(1, 61) = 1.37, p = .25, ηp
2
 = .022), but trait social anxiety positively predicted this 
variable (F(1, 61) = 5.64, p = .02, ηp
2
 = .085; pr(62) = .30, p = .02).  
Discussion 
To begin investigating potential underlying mechanisms for the stress buffering 
effects of self-distancing uncovered in Study 1, Study 2 assessed participants’ cognitive 
appraisals immediately after the manipulation. As hypothesized, the distanced group 
appraised their expected speech as less of a threat, according to combined ratings of task 
demand and stress/anxiety, than participants in the other two conditions. The lack of 
moderation by trait social anxiety for this finding further supports the idea that those high 
in this individual difference are equally helped by the self-distancing intervention. In 
other words, it seems that distancing in this way before an acute stressor reduces overall 
threat appraisal of the event, regardless of trait social anxiety level.  
Although the distanced group reported feeling better able to cope with the speech 
task compared to the other two conditions, indicating greater challenge appraisal, the 
differences were not large enough to be considered statistically significant. Similarly, the 
group means for the stress/anxiety rating displayed the hypothesized direction, with the 




three means were also not significantly different. This study’s small sample sizes, and 
thus low power, is a likely reason for these null findings, especially considering the 
medium effect size for the group differences in stress/anxiety ratings.  
Surprisingly, the means of the control group were between the distanced and 
immersed on almost every dependent variable. Participants in this condition had been  
expected to show results nearly identical to those in the immersed group because they 
were not instructed to do anything specific during the manipulation period and prior  
research has found that people usually spontaneously adopt an immersed perspective 
during self-reflection (Ayduk & Kross, 2010b), Additionally, most people probably use 
first person pronouns automatically while thinking about themselves. Fortunately, 
participants wrote an essay at the very end of the study describing what they had thought 
about during the three minute manipulation/wait period, which provided insight into what 
those in the control condition did with this free time. Most reported continuing to prepare 
and practice their speech, which means that the control condition ended up having twice 
as long to do this as those in the other two groups. It is hard to imagine that more 
preparation for the public speech wouldn’t impact the anxiety and appraisals of these 
individuals. Although this condition did not serve as the desired true control, its inclusion 
still seems to speak to the beneficial effects of self-distancing in the face of a stressor. 
Despite only having half as much time to prepare for the speech as the control group, the 
self-distanced condition reported significantly less threat appraisal of the task and showed 
more adaptive means on the rest of the dependent variables. 
Although the results of Study 2 overall did not provide as much support as 






















The ability to adaptively regulate stress is a fundamental challenge for many 
people. In response to this pervasive need, researchers have begun seeking minimal, 
albeit effective, psychological interventions. This dissertation aimed to further this line of 
research by developing a brief reconstrual exercise to help people adaptively cope in the 
face of extreme acute stress. 
Considering the success of cognitive reappraisal for emotion regulation in a few 
recent studies (Gross, 1998; Jamieson, et al., 2011; Mauss, et al., 2007), self-distancing 
was investigated here as a potential minimal stress intervention. By increasing 
psychological distance from the self, individuals can reflect more broadly on a distressing 
experience, which better allows them to work-through and reconstrue it in a way that 
reduces negative affect and harmful rumination. Prior to this dissertation, however, self-
distancing research had focused exclusively on regulating adverse emotion due to 
recalled past events; whether individuals could self-distance in response to an upcoming 
acute stressor remained unknown until now.  
The experiments in this thesis revealed that self-distancing not only helps people 
adaptively cope with unresolved anger and depression from the past, but also with stress 
and anxiety due to the future. In Study 1, self-distancing via the use of non-first person 
pronouns and one’s own name while reflecting on an upcoming stressful speech resulted 




regulatory depletion than self-immersion through typical first person pronoun usage. 
Although the results were not as strong as expected, Study 2 still indicated that modified 
cognitive appraisals likely play a role in the beneficial effects of self-distancing before a 
potent stressor. At the very least, this second study found evidence supporting the notion 
that self-distancing can decrease threat appraisal (i.e., viewing the task as highly 
demanding and feeling great stress/anxiety over performance) of an upcoming stressful 
event. When psychological distance is increased, it might become easier for people to 
change their initial appraisal of an anticipated event since they are not so overwhelmed 
with negative affect. If they are better able to think through their thoughts and feelings 
with regard to the stressor, reconstrual of the situation and a healthier reappraisal 
containing less threat may be achievable.   
As reviewed in the introduction, self-distancing studies have consistently shown 
that when people are not so overwhelmed with “hot” negative affect, it is easier for them 
to reconstrue a past experience and work through it more adaptively (Kross & Ayduk, 
2011). The results of this dissertation, particularly the finding from Study 2 that 
distancing reduced the overall threat appraisal of the stressful event, appear in line with 
this work. Also consistent with prior research, distanced participants in Study 1 reported 
lower negative affect, demonstrated healthier reflection via less recounting compared to 
reconstruing, and performed more effectively on the task than immersed participants. 
Considering that the rumination measures in the first study occurred about 10 minutes 
after the end of the speech, self-distancing appears to not only benefit cognition and 
emotion in the moment, but also over time. It would be interesting for future research to 




Finally, considering that neither study found the moderation of any effects by trait 
social anxiety, this dissertation provides evidence that a minimal self-distance induction 
can provide a buffer against negative consequences for even those most vulnerable to a 
social stressor. As previously discussed, the cognitive reconstrual exercise used here to 
promote the working through of emotions from a distanced perspective is likely very 
different from the maladaptive observer’s perspective that this group often spontaneously 
adopts in social situations. Even though both involve a sort of psychological removal 
from the self, socially anxious people tend to visualize stressful events as if they were an 
audience member of their own performance, while self-distanced participants are asked to 
consider their self objectively by adopting neither their usual own, nor a specific other’s, 
viewpoint. Thus, distanced individuals presumably take a broader perspective on their 
emotions and the stressor, which promotes the working through of why they are thinking 
and feeling what they are without becoming overwhelmed.  
 If people with clinical levels of social anxiety also equally gain from self-
distancing before an acute stressor, an important question for future work, current 
treatments for stress and anxiety may benefit from incorporating this simple exercise into 
extant techniques. For example, cognitive-behavioral therapies could ask patients to 
practice emotionally reflective exercises using their own name and other non-first person 
pronouns when referring to themselves. Additional benefit and/or acceleration of 
treatment progress seems possible, especially considering that Study 1 found distancing 
to not only promote self-regulation, but also reduce subsequent regulatory depletion. 
Theoretically, this could assist with further acts requiring self-control, possibly allowing 




Although explicit evidence  that the positive effects shown in this dissertation extend to 
participants with clinically diagnosed social anxiety is needed, previous studies showing 
similar, or even better, results of self-distancing for participants with major depressive 
and bipolar disorders (Gruber, et al., 2009; Kross, et al., 2012; Wisco & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2011) suggests that people with clinical anxiety levels might also benefit 
from this simple technique.  
Future research should also seek direct evidence that cognitive appraisals at least 
partially mediate the stress-buffering effects of self-distance seen in Study 1, perhaps by 
using a short implicit measure between the manipulation and a stressor in order to reduce 
potential disruption. Additionally, it would be beneficial to explore whether there are any 
situations where challenge appraisals also increase as a result of self-distancing, or if 
threat appraisals alone are affected. Future work in this area could also investigate 
whether additional methods to increase self-distance exist beyond visual perspective 
taking and atypical self-referent pronoun use during emotional reflection, as well as work 
to reveal the specific contexts in which each provides optimal assistance. As previously 
mentioned, distancing through non-first person pronoun use may be more helpful for self-
regulation surrounding a future event that lacks vivid mental imagery, but distancing via 
visualization may be better for working through past occurrences that are easy to 
imagine.  
By using a public speaking task, considered the most effective and robust way to 
induce stress in the laboratory, the results of this dissertation may highly generalize to the 
real world. For example, students of almost any age could likely be taught to use this 




presentation. People afraid of flying might be better able to regulate their stress and 
anxiety before take-off. Further illustrations include doctors faced with performing a 
difficult surgery, lawyers about to cross-examine an important witness, and military 
personnel entering a combat zone. There are numerous potential avenues for applying 
this minimal technique to benefit the affect and actions of those anticipating a stressful 
circumstance. Although people do not typically refer to themselves using their own name 
and non-first person pronouns, most could easily learn and implement this simple self-
distancing exercise to increase their adaptive responses to acute stressors in daily life. As 
earlier discussed, this self-distancing method has been successfully used to examine 
behavior and affect surrounding an evaluated social interaction; however, future research 
is still needed to identify other types of stressful situations, particularly those that are 
non-social in nature, which may benefit from this minimal intervention. Overall, though, 
the findings presented in this dissertation support the idea that a brief self-distancing 
exercise can help to buffer people against the unhealthy thoughts, feelings, and behaviors 
that are typically associated with an upcoming stressor, possibly by increasing their 

















Dependent Variables M SD M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Speech performance   3.60 0.78 3.17 0.85 __ -.30
**
 -.04 -.12 -.06 





3. Ruminative thought content 0.33 1.03 0.98 1.23   __ .55
**
 .03 
4. Self-report rumination 3.47   1.01 3.91 1.13    __ -.04 




p ≤ .10.  
*
p≤ .05.  
**
p ≤ .01. 
***














Figure 1. Path analysis. Baseline affect is used as a covariate but not shown in the figure. 
Values represent standardized path coefficients. 
*
p≤ .05.  
**
p ≤ .01. 
***
















Appendix 1. Full manipulation scripts. 
Self-distanced condition:  
Besides preparing the content of a speech, people also need to prepare themselves 
psychologically before giving a speech, so this is an additional issue we are interested in 
exploring in this study. We’d like to learn more about the different ways people go about 
preparing themselves to give a speech and what effect each type of self-preparation has 
on their performance. Some people report thinking to their self using their own name, and 
other non-first person pronouns before giving a speech, so this is one type of self-
preparation that we are interested in examining. To investigate the effects of this 
preparation method on speech performance, we would like you to think through your 
current thoughts and feelings about your upcoming speech for the next three minutes 
using your own name and other non-first person pronouns such as you and he (she was 
used by the experimenter if a female participant) as much as possible as you try to 
understand the emotions you are currently experiencing. In other words, ask yourself, 
“why is [the experimenter filled in the participant’s name here] feeling the way he (or 
she) is? What are the causes and reasons underlying [participant’s name] feelings? Does 
this make sense? Do you have any questions? (the experimenter paused for a few seconds 
to see if they were confused) Okay, I’ll be back in about 3 minutes. 
 
Self-immersed condition:  
Besides preparing the content of a speech, people also need to prepare themselves 
psychologically before giving a speech, so this is an additional issue we are interested in 
exploring in this study. We’d like to learn more about the different ways people go about 
preparing themselves to give a speech and what effect each type of self-preparation has 
on their performance. Some people report thinking to their self using first person 
pronouns before giving a speech, so this is one type of self-preparation that we are 
interested in examining. To investigate the effects of this preparation method on speech 
performance, we would like you to think through your current thoughts and feelings 
about your upcoming speech for the next three minutes using the pronouns I and my as 
much as possible as you try to understand the emotions you are currently experiencing. In 
other words, ask yourself, “why am I feeling this way? What are the causes and reasons 
underlying my feelings? Does this make sense? Do you have any questions? (the 
experimenter paused for a few seconds to see if they were confused) Okay, I’ll be back in 
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